

PSR(IC)3

From: WAATEA.S2
Sent: Sunday, 15 August 2010 10:44 p.m.
To: 'ARIKI.COMD'; SWAN - JFNZ.J2
Cc: 'CRIB.PRT-COS'; SWAN - CRIB.S2; WAATEA.SNO; WAATEA.OC
Subject: RE: ~~[ISAF-SECRET]~~ Targeting insurgents

CLASSIFICATION: ~~ISAF-SECRET~~

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Sir

Following liaison with Crib 16, we (TF81) have sent updated JPEL nominations to RC-E via ISAF SOF for Mullah Abdullah KALTA, Malawi NEMATULLAH and Qari MIRAJ. These are expected to be processed and approved in the next two days. We are also working up a JPEL pack for PSR(Sen)1 and a re-brief for Qari MUSA. These will also be forwarded to RC-E via ISAF SOF for approval. These should be submitted NLT mid next week. We continue to request ISR to confirm POL of persons and compounds of interest in the tgt area. In support of the second/third order of effects we intend to leave a modified version of our current stay behind message and we will also develop a radio IO message to be distributed through ISAF SOF to the appropriate battle space owners.

Regards

PSR(IC)3

From: ARIKI.COMD PSR(IC)3
Sent: Sunday, 15 August 2010 1:02 p.m.
To: SWAN - JFNZ.J2
Cc: JFNZ.J23-3; WAATEA.S2; CRIB.PRT-COS; CRIB. ^{PSR(S)2, PSR}; SWAN - CRIB.INT-SNCO; SWAN - CRIB.S2
Subject: RE: Targeting insurgents

PSR(IC)3

I fully agree/support PSR(IC)3 assessment below - ^{PSR(IC)3} captured our position well and ^{PSR(IC)} target list is accurate. Can't emphasize enough the second order effect should no CF action take place - and ^{PSR(IC)3} has mentioned this. I am absolutely convinced from KLE conducted since the contact that, should no DA against those individuals listed by ^{PSR(IC)3} be taken, then the PRT will be seen as weak and will not only will our security/development messages be undermined but the INS will be encouraged to have another crack.

PSR(IC)3

From: CRIB.S2
Sent: Sunday, 15 August 2010 11:54 a.m.
To: JFNZ.J2
Cc: JFNZ.J23-3; 'WAATEA.S2'; ARIKI.COMD; CRIB.PRT-COS; CRIB. ^{PSR(S)2, PSR}; CRIB.INT-SNCO
Subject: RE: Targeting insurgents

PSR(S)2, P

All ACK.

Targeting Process

PRT does not have a robust targeting process per se as (1) we don't conduct kinetic targeting operations and our (2) IO targeting is based on the professional judgment of the COS' Communications Group. There is no CRIB Targeting SOP.

If we were to conduct targeting, it would be an ops matter linked to ^{PSR(S)2, PSR(S)} collection. Doctrinally, this is also an ops matter for which NZPRT is ill-equipped in terms of capability and staff.

Given these limitations, it falls to the S2 Cell to apply some intellectual rigour. Target Packs have been created and distributed to the appropriate authorities. Formally, this is through ^{PSR(S)1} for submission through RC-E for inclusion on the HQ ISAF JPEL. This has not yielded any results thus far and is not likely to given theatre-wide priorities. We have only one JPEL nominee (Qari MUSA), who has now dropped off the list. ^{PSR(Sen)1} target pack has also been passed on to RC-E (info RC-N). He has not been approved thus far. Probably won't be...

Following recent events, we are now focusing on KALTA, NEMATULLAH and ^{PSR(Sen)1}. Basic S2 Target Packs have been sent to TF81. ^{PSR(S)2, PSR(S)} is working with TF81 to provide the high-side intelligence required to obtain appropriate SOF approval. We have little visibility on this. An additional pack is being created by us for ^{PSR(Sen)1}, but contains little info at this stage.

Complicating the whole issue is ^{PSR(Sen)1} insistence that only ^{PSR(S)1} HUMINT reporting is accredited for target packs. We are having to re-engineer some of our HUMINT reports accordingly. The new HCT is looking good so far, so the next tranche of HUMINT will be suitable.

Target List

My priorities are:

Mullah Abdullah KALTA.

The capture/killing of Abdul KALTA is likely to remove a Key TB commander operating in both BAMYAN and BAGHLAN Provinces. Abdul KALTA has been directly and indirectly linked to INS and criminal activity in BAMYAN and BAGHLAN Provinces. The removal of Abdul KALTA is likely to reduce INS attacks on CF/ANSF in BAMYAN and restore local population belief in CF/ANSF ability to provide security.

Malawi NEMATULLAH.

The capture/killing of NEMATULLAH is likely to remove a Key TB commander operating in both BAMYAN and BAGHLAN Provinces. NEMATULLAH has been directly and indirectly linked to INS and criminal activity in BAMYAN and BAGHLAN Provinces. The removal of NEMATULLAH is likely to reduce INS attacks on CF/ANSF in BAMYAN and restore local population belief in CF/ANSF ability to provide security.

Qari MIRAJ.

The capture/killing of Qari MIRAJ is likely to remove a Key TB commander operating in both BAMYAN and BAGHLAN Provinces. MIRAJ has been directly and indirectly linked to INS and criminal activity in BAMYAN and BAGHLAN Provinces. Reportedly involved in LBG IED incident 05 JUL 10. MIRAJ has also been linked to the murder of two German Journalists in 2006.

^{PSR(Sen)1}

Qari MUSA.

The capture/killing of MUSA is likely to remove a Key TB commander operating in both BAMYAN and BAGHLAN Provinces. MUSA has been directly and indirectly linked to INS and criminal activity in BAMYAN and BAGHLAN Provinces. The removal of MUSA is likely to reduce INS attacks on CF/ANSF in BAMYAN and restore local population belief in CF/ANSF ability to provide security.

^{PSR(Sen)1}

PSR(Sen)1

These prominent POIs are prioritised by S2 based on regular situational reviews and current reporting. Selection criteria include the number of reports, significance of the reports and weighting of the following SANDA:

KT Patrols

PSR(S)1

Law Enforcement Professional (LEP)

S2 MILO with ANSF PSR(S)1

INTOPS own collection acty and liaison with PSR(Sen)1 and PSR(Sen)1 ANP

PSR(S)1

PSR(S)1

PSR(S)1

Other PRT personnel

NGO.

OSINT.

Second and Third Order Effects

We monitor and assess based on our professional judgement. We now know that several of the TWB belligerents are ideologically motivated and financially dependent on the insurgency orchestrated by PAK-based TBSL. In our judgement, they are *irreconcilable*. No amount of reconstruction and development, or local IO effort, will alter their perceptions, attitudes and behaviour. It follows that we must negate the threat they pose through kinetic targeting.

Second order effects include the creation of INS C2 challenges and the message sent to lower-level fighters. We assess that some of the financially motivated local fighters would be less inclined to take up arms. They would also experience a C2 setback given their inherent rivalries and the removal of charismatic leaders.

Third order effects are centred on the LN CIVPOP. PSR(Sen)1

Direct targeting of key INS leaders would further their cause. The situation is different in S TWB. TIRGIRAN and GARDENDEH LNs stand to gain little from projected development. They are more insular and prone to TB rhetoric. Direct targeting of INS leaders may strengthen their support for TB. We should also factor in PSR(Sen)1 cultural norms: any failure to act on our part is likely to be interpreted-and exploited-as a sign of CF weakness.

A major effect would be the message sent to the remaining population of AO BAMYAN. PSR(Sen)1 would generally welcome ISAF resolve-particularly if credit can be given to any related joint CF/ANP operations. PSR(Sen)1 are likely to remain ambivalent. Some may quietly welcome ISAF resolve to create better conditions for further economic development.

International partners would generally welcome firm action to improve the security of the NE AO including SHIKARI VY and S SHIBAR.

This is only my view: comment/feedback/corrections/direction welcome!

Regards

PSR(IC)3

S2 TU CRIB

M: PSR(IC)3

DTelN: PSR(IC)3

From: JFNZ.J2 PSR(IC)3

Sent: Friday, 13 August 2010 07:26

To: CRIB.S2

Cc: JFNZ.J23-3

Subject: Targeting insurgents

PSR(IC)3

COMJ, J3 and I are across the TF 81 CONOPS looking at potential activity in TWB. I would like to be able to confirm that we have a robust process for identifying which insurgents to target and the second and third order effects of removing them, either by arrest or through a kill. In order to assist with this and to improve intelligence coordination in general I am sending PSR(IC)3 into town to work with the PSR(S)2, PE

Is it possible that we could have visibility of the target list (if there is one) and then work with you on how you identify priority targets. I'm mindful that we don't want to inhibit the process or slow it down - but merely add analytical support to the process in addition to your own. COMJ has directed me and my staff to work with TF 81, TG6, yourself and PSR(S)2, PE

Cheers

PSR(IC)3

J2

HQ JFNZ

PSR(IC)3